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NOTES
EMPLOYER INTENTIONAL TORTS IN VIRGINIA: PROPOSAL
FOR AN EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIVE WORKERS'
COMPENSATION REMEDY
I. INTRODUCTION
Workers' compensation is a no-fault' system of recovery implemented
by statute in every state.2 Originating in the nature of a compromise, the
workers' compensation system is the exclusive remedy between the em-
ployee and employer.3 The majority of states, however, recognize an ex-
ception 4 to this exclusivity provision where an employer's actions consti-
tute an intentional tort.5 Virginia has yet to recognize such an exception
by statute or judicial action.'
1. However, employee fault is relevant in the statutory scheme as to whether the em-
ployee receives compensation. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-2-8 (Burns 1986 Repl. Vol.);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-12 (1985); VA. CoDE ANN. § 65.1-38 (Repl. Vol. 1987) (prohibiting com-
pensation if the injury or death results from certain employee misconduct); see also infra
notes 127-31 and accompanying text.
2. E.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 65.1-1 to -163 (Repl. Vol. 1987 & Cum. Supp. 1990). For a list of
each state's codified workers' compensation laws, see Note, Michigan Worker's Disability
Compensation Act: The Intentional Tort Exception to the Exclusive Remedy Provision, 23
VAL. U.L. REv. 371, 379 n.47 (1989) [hereinafter Note, Michigan Tort Exception].
3. All fifty states' workers' compensation statutes expressly include an exclusive remedy
provision. For a list of each state's codified exclusivity provision, see Note, Michigan Tort
Exception, supra note 2, at 383 n.74. "The Virginia Workers' Compensation Act provides
the exclusive remedy to an employee for recovery against his employer for an injury arising
out of and in the course of employment," without a choice of remedies. VA. CODE ANN. §
65.1-40 (Repl. Vol. 1987); see also L. PASCAL, VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION: LAW AND
PRACTICE § 2.19 (1986 & Supp. 1990).
4. Some states enacted exceptions by statute, while other states recognize exceptions by
judicial action in the absence of legislative enactment. See infra notes 36-83 and accompa-
nying text.
5. Often the issue of whether a common law suit for damages will lie against the employer
in an intentional tort claim is presented in the form of an "upside-down" case, where the
exclusiveness of the Workers' Compensation Act is used defensively by the employer. 2A A.
LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 68.30, at 13,86 n.42.2 (1990). In this case
the parties' usual interests are reversed, "with the employee seeking a restrictive interpreta-
tion of compensation and the employer an expansive one." Id.
6. See Haddon v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 239 Va. 397, 389 S.E.2d 712 (1990) (Su-
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The history, philosophy, and purpose of the workers' compensation sys-
tem is discussed in Section II of this Note. Section III reviews the judicial
and legislative exceptions recognized by other states for employers' inten-
tional injuries and the bases for these exceptions. Part IV discusses and
evaluates the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act (the Act) and judicial
refusal to recognize an intentional tort exception. Finally, Part V argues
for a Virginia statutory exception to the exclusive remedy rule for inten-
tional injury by employers, which would promote fairness, consistency,
and deterrence of employer misconduct' in accord with the purposes of
the Act.'
II. HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION SYSTEM
The modern workers' compensation system originated in Germany in
1884.1 Its roots were philosophical or political, expounding a socialistic
view into an industrial type of insurance.10 Later, England enacted its
Workers' Compensation Act in response to dissatisfaction with the com-
mon law fellow-servant rule. 1 The British Act, containing the "arising
out of" and "in the course of employment" language, 2 stimulated wide-
spread interest and served as a model for the acts passed by many Ameri-
can states in the early 1900's."
The first American compensation acts were constitutionally chal-
lenged.1 4 In 1916, the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitu-
preme Court of Virginia held injuries suffered by an employee as a result of harassment and
sexual discrimination by a fellow employee to be an "accident" under the Virginia Workers'
Compensation Act, and therefore, a common law suit for damages was barred by the Act's
exclusive remedy). But see McGreevy v. Racal-Dana Instruments, 690 F. Supp. 468 (E.D.
Va. 1988) (U.S. District Court, applying Virginia law, held an employee's claim for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress was not an "accident" and thus not barred by the
Workers' Compensation Act's exclusive provision).
7. See infra notes 135-53 and accompanying text. See generally Comment, Intentional
Employer Torts: A Matter for the California Legislature, 15 U.S.F. L. REv. 651 (1981).
8. See infra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
9. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 5, § 5.10, at 33; L. PASCAL, supra note 3, at 1. However, the
German system is distinguishable from the American systems in that contributions were
made by the German worker himself, whereas only the employer contributes in the Ameri-
can systems. 1 A. LARSON, § 5.10 at 34-35.
10. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 5, § 5.10 at 33-34; L. PASCAL, supra note 3, at 1.
11. This dissatisfaction with the common law rules was similarly seen in the American
states. For a discussion of the common law defenses to an employee's action against his
employer which often prevent recovery, see infra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
12. This language is explicitly used in today's workers' compensation statutes by various
states to define what kind of "injury" is covered. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-7 (Repl.
Vol. 1987).
13. L. PASCAL, supra note 3, at 2.
14. See, e.g., In re Madden, 222 Mass. 487, 111 N.E. 379 (1916) (employers claimed that
responsibility without fault in Massachusetts's Worker's Compensation Act amounted to a
taking of property without due process of law).
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tionality of the no-fault system.15 Thereafter, states gradually enacted
workers' compensation acts. The first Virginia Workers' Compensation
Act was enacted in 1918.16 By 1949, every American state had workers'
compensation statutes.17
The rapid acceptance of workers' compensation statutes1 8 was largely
due to frustration with the limited tort liability of the master to his ser-
vant at common law. 9 An injured worker could sue his employer under a
negligence theory,20 but the possibility of recovery was restricted by the
"unholy trinity" of common law defenses: contributory negligence, as-
sumption of the risk, and the fellow-servant rule.2 ' Hence, under the com-
mon law system, the greater burden in industrial accidents fell upon the
worker, who ,was least able to support that burden. The prevalence of
industrial accidents as a by-product of the industrial revolution and the
limited chance of recovery at common law in the courts led to the enact-
ment of today's workers' compensation system. The underlying theory is
to place the limited economic burden of these injuries on industry, as a
cost of production, and thereby pass it ultimately to the consumer."
15. New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1916).
16. Act of March 21, 1918, ch. 400, 1918 Va. Acts 637. When enacted, the Virginia Act was
based on the act in existence in Indiana. Accordingly, the Virginia courts have often relied
on Indiana decisions when construing the Virginia statute. See Barksdale v. H.O. Engen,
Inc., 218 Va. 496, 499, 237 S.E.2d 794, 796 (1977) ("The Virginia Workmen's Compensation
Act is based upon the Indiana statute, so that the construction placed upon the Indiana law
by the courts of that state merits our consideration."); see also Ray, Evans & Steele, Recov-
ery for Accidental Injuries Under the Virginia Workmen's Compensation Act, 14 U. RICH.
L. REv. 659, 660 n.2 (1980). But see Haddon v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 239 Va. 397, 399,
389 S.E.2d 712, 714 (1990) ("Although ... we have considered decisions interpreting provi-
sions of the Indiana Act when similar to our Act, we are not persuaded by Indiana decisions
which may be at odds with substantial Virginia precedent ....").
17. See 1 A. LARSON, supra note 5, § 5.10 at 33, § 5.30 at 39.
18. "[No subject of labor legislation ever has made such progress or received such general
acceptance of its principles in so brief a period." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS § 80, at 530 & n.36 (4th ed. 1971) (citing U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bull. No.
126 at 9 (1913)).
19. See id. at 530.
20. A common law negligence suit was the only way for an employee to receive any com-
pensation for work-related injuries, unless the employer voluntarily compensated the em-
ployee. See generally 1 A. LARSON, supra note 5, § 4.30, at 25-28.
21. For a detailed discussion of each defense, see W. PROSSER, supra note 18, § 80, at 526-
27. For instance, the risk of hazards often existing in an industry were deemed to be ac-
cepted by an employee as an incident of his employment. He assumed the risk, thereby
barring any recovery for the usual industrial accident. See id. at 527.
22. See 1 A. LARSON, supra note 5, § 1.00, at 1; W. PROSSER, supra note 18, § 80, at 531.
The financial burden is lifted from the shoulders of the employee, and placed upon
the employer, who is expected to add it to his costs, and so transfer it to the con-
sumer. In this he is aided and controlled by a system of compulsory liability insur-
ance, which equalizes the burden over the entire industry. Through such insurance
both the master and the servant are protected at the expense of the ultimate
consumer.
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Thus, workers' compensation is founded upon insurance principles.
Workers' compensation is a mechanism for providing cash benefits 23
and medical care to individuals injured in employment-related accidents 24
without regard to fault. The workers' compensation system developed as
a compromise between the employer and employee, with each surrender-
ing common law rights to gain advantages under the act.2 5 The compensa-
tion system was designed as a quid pro quo exchange between the em-
ployee and employer.26 Employers became liable for their employees'
work-related injuries without regard to negligence or fault, but were pro-
tected from common law suits and unlimited liability. In return, employ-
ees accepted lower benefits, but were given a greater likelihood of recov-
ery, since employers could not rely on the common law defenses.27
As a result of this no-fault compromise, the workers' compensation sys-
tem was the exclusive remedy2 for employees injured in work-related ac-
cidents. Attaining a humanitarian, beneficent and remedial result in favor
of the worker was a noted purpose of workers' compensation acts.29 The
23. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 65.1-54 to -82 (Repl. Vol. 1987 & Cum. Supp. 1990). The
Act provides cash benefits for partial and total incapacitity, loss of specific body parts, and
death. It also includes compensation for lost earnings based on average weekly wages. Ray,
Evans & Steele, supra note 16, at 660 n.3. Compensation under the Act does not restore the
actual loss sustained, but gives the claimant enough, when added to his remaining earning
capacity, to enable him to exist without being a burden to others. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 5,
§ 2.50 at 11. The rationale is that full recovery for the actual loss, although recognized by
tort principles, may encourage malingering. Id. at 12.
24. The definition of "accident" in determining coverage under a workers' compensation
statute varies from state to state. See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
25. See Feitig v. Chalkley 185 Va. 96, 98-99, 38 S.E.2d 73, 73-74 (1946); see also Special
Project, Intentional Acts: Finding a Legal Remedy, 30 How. L.J. 563 (1987); Comment,
supra note 7, at 651.
26. Special Project, supra note 25, at 563. See generally 1 A. LARSON, supra note 5, § 1.10,
at 1-2.
27. See Feitig, 185 Va. at 98-99, 38 S.E.2d at-73-74.
28. See Special Project, supra note 25, at 563; Comment, supra note 7, at 651. By opera-
tion of law, the employee surrendered his common law right of action for full damages
against his employer and agreed to accept a sum fixed by statute. Fauver v. Bell, 192 Va.
518, 522, 65 S.E.2d 575, 577 (1951). The Virginia Act provides:
The rights and remedies herein granted to an employee . . . on account of personal
injury or death by accident shall exclude all other rights and remedies of such em-
ployee, his personal representative, parents, dependents or next of kin, at common
law or otherwise, on account of such injury, loss of service or death.
VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-40 (Repl. Vol. 1987) (emphasis added).
Professor Larson states that the two central purposes of exclusiveness are maintaining the
balance of sacrifices between the employer and employee in their substitute no-fault liability
and minimizing litigation despite its merit. Furthermore, he states that "unjust" results are
commonplace in a no-fault system. 2A A. LARSON, supra note 5, § 68.15, at 13-65.
29. See, e.g., Griffith v. Raven Red Ash Coal Co., 179 Va. 790, 796, 20 S.E.2d 530, 533
(1942) ("Although in derogation of the common law, [the Virginia Workers' Compensation
Act] is highly remedial and should be liberally construed in favor of the workman."); Bur-
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promotion of a safe work environment was another avowed purpose.30
Thus, the dual policy of the workers' compensation system is to provide
adequate compensation for certain injuries and to encourage a safe
workplace.
III. JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE TREATMENT OF THE INTENTIONAL TORT
EXCEPTION BY OTHER STATES
Historically, the exclusive no-fault liability of the workers' compensa-
tion system was based on ordinary negligence principles. 1 Courts readily
agree that ordinary employer negligence is covered by the exclusive rem-
edy; it naturally flows from, and is consistent with, the underlying policy
of the system. However, a majority of states maintain that employer in-
tentional torts are outside the exclusive coverage of the workers' compen-
sation system.32 States have recognized such an exception by judicial,3 as
well as legislative, 34 action and have imposed varying standards3 5 to sat-
isfy the "intentional tort" exception.
A. Judicial Bases for the Intentional Tort Exception
Judicially created intentional tort exceptions to the exclusive remedy of
the workers' compensation system are prevalent because few states have
lington Mills Corp. v. Hagood, 177 Va. 204, 210, 13 S.E.2d 291, 293 (1941) ("The Compensa-
tion Act is intended to be remedial and must be liberally construed in favor of the em-
ployee."); A.N. Campbell & Co. v. Messenger, 171 Va. 374, 377, 199 S.E. 511, 513 (1938)
("[I]t is always the endeavor of the court to construe the compensation statute liberally, in
order to carry out its beneficent purpose.").
30. Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chems., 69 Ohio St. 2d 608, -, 433 N.E.2d 572,
577, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 857 (1982)(superseded by statute); see also Note, Right of Em-
ployee to Sue Employer for an Intentional Tort, 26 IND. L.J. 280 (1951) [hereinafter Note,
Right to Sue]; Note, Workers' Compensation: Expanding the Intentional Tort Exception
to Include Willful, Wanton, and Reckless Employer Misconduct, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
890 (1983) [hereinafter Note, Willful, Wanton Exception].
31. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
32. For a listing of those states recognizing the intentional tort exception, see 2A A. LAR-
SON, supra note 5, § 68.13, at 13-10 n.11 and the cases cited therein.
33. For a detailed discussion of the judicial bases for recognizing an exception to the ex-
clusive remedy for employer intentional injury where no statutory exception exists, see infra
notes 36-67 and accompanying text.
34. For example, the Washington statute provides:
If the injury results to a worker from the deliberate intention of his or her employer
to produce such injury, the worker or beneficiary of the worker shall have the privi-
lege to take under this title and also have cause of action against the employer as if
this title had not been enacted, for any damages in excess of compensation and bene-
fits paid or payable under this title.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 51.24.020 (1990) (emphasis added). See infra notes 75-83 and ac-
companying text.
35. See infra notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
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statutorily created the exception."6 This judicial action relies on several
legal theories and policy arguments for support.
1. The "Nonaccident Exception"
One theory applied by many courts is that an employer is prevented
from claiming his intentional act was "accidental" under the exclusive
coverage of the workers' compensation act.3 7 This "nonaccidental" excep-
tion is based on an estoppel theory.38 Under this theory, the employer is
estopped from relying on the limited workers' compensation recovery
once the employer's conduct strays from accidental acts and instead in-
volves intentional, blameworthy conduct, as in the case of intentional
torts. The "nonaccidental" exception has been judicially adopted by
many states, including Georgia," South Carolina,40 Pennsylvania,41 Mich-
igan,42 New York,43 Minnesota" and Indiana.45 The applications of this
exception tend to vary depending on the individual state's accepted defi-
nition of "accident.
46
36. Many states' acts have only a provision stating that workers' compensation is the ex-
clusive remedy. Without codified statutory exceptions to this general rule, courts are left to
interpret the statute as written. For example, the Supreme Court of Michigan interpreted
the Michigan act to allow an exception "[b]ecause the Legislature was addressing accidental,
not intentional, injuries, and employee's preexisting remedy for intentional torts by the em-
ployer was not affected by the act absent clear expression to the contrary." Beauchamp v.
Dow Chem. Co., 427 Mich. 1, -, 398 N.W.2d 882, 887 (1986) (superseded by statute).
37. 2A A. LARSON, supra note 5, § 68.11, at 13-4. Although Larson believes this theory is
the best, the theory only applies where the states impose the "by accident" requirement in
their workers' compensation statutes. Id.; see also Comment, supra note 7, at 674 n.118.
38. Comment, supra note 7, at 674.
39. Skelton v. W.T. Grant Co., 331 F.2d 593 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 830 (1964);
Smith v. Rich's, Inc., 104 Ga. App. 883, 123 S.E.2d 316 (1961).
40. Stewart v. McLellan's Stores Co., 194 S.C. 50, 9 S.E.2d 35 (1940).
41. Readinger v. Gottschall, 201 Pa. Super. 134, -, 191 A.2d 694, 696 (1963) (intentional
assault held not within the purview of the Pennsylvania act when interpreting an "accident
in the course of the employment").
42. Beauchamp v. Dow Chem. Co., 427 Mich. 1, 398 N.W.2d 882 (1986) (superseded by
statute).
43. Le Pochat v. Pendleton, 187 Misc. 296, 63 N.Y.S.2d 313 (1946), aff'd, 271 A.D. 964, 68
N.Y.S.2d 594 (1947).
44. Boek v. Wong Hing, 180 Minn. 470, -, 231 N.W. 233, 234 (1930) ("An employer who
intentionally and maliciously inflicts bodily injuries on his servant should occupy no better
position than would a third party not under a Compensation Act, and should not be heard
to say, when sued at law for damages, . . . that the injury was accidental ...").
45. National Can Corp. v. Jovanovich, 503 N.E.2d 1224 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987). Indiana's
exception is especially significant since Virginia modeled Its workers' compensation act after
Indiana's. See supra note 16.
46. In case law, states construe differently the "accident" requirement in their respective
acts. If a state broadly defines "accident," then the state's workers' compensation act be-
comes more inclusive and protects a greater range of employer (mis)conduct within the ex-
clusive remedy. The inverse is true if a state narrowly defines "accident." Compare Read-
inger v. Gottschall, 201 Pa. Super. 134, -, 191 A.2d 694, 696 (1963) (in Pennsylvania,
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To prevent such fortuitous results, Professor Larson offers an alterna-
tive construction of "accident." Larson suggests that viewing whether an
incident is an "accident" should be determined from the viewpoint of the
person seeking protection under the exclusive remedy of the act.47 Larson
theorizes that employers defending themselves against intentional tort
claims would typically plead civil immunity from suit under the exclusive
remedy provision of an act. Therefore, under Larson's view, an incident
involving an intentional tort would probably not be deemed an accident.
Accordingly, the common law action would not be barred.
2. The "Severed" Relationship Exception
A second theory advanced by some courts in recognizing an intentional
tort exception is that the employment relationship is "severed" by an em-
ployer's act of violence.48 Although this theory is criticized as being ficti-
tious,49 it has been accepted and followed by several courts.50 The theory
also has been utilized to allow a common law right of action for damages
involving nonphysical torts,'1 despite the implication that the theory is
"accident" means any undesigned event) with Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Hosey, 208 Va. 568,
159 S.E.2d 633 (1968) (in Virginia, "accident" means an unusual event, unexpected by the
person to whom it happens).
47. 2A A. LARSON, supra note 5, § 68.12, at 13-9. Difficulty arose because courts, by view-
ing the affair from the viewpoint of the victim rather than the assailant, found deliberate
assaults by co-employees or third persons to be "accidents" under the acts. However, Larson
suggests a better approach may be to view the affair from the person claiming an act's pro-
tection as a matter of pleading. If the employee is seeking benefits under an act, then
whether the incident is an accident would be determined from his perspective. Where the
employer is pleading the exclusive remedy provision as a defense, whether the incident is
considered an accident would be determined from his perspective. See id.; see also
Beauchamp v. Dow Chem. Co., 427 Mich. 1, -, 398 N.W.2d 882, 888 (citing 2A A. LARSON,
supra note 5, § 68.12, at 13-8).
48. 2A A. LARSON, supra note 5, § 68.11, at 13-4; Comment, supra note 7, at'674.
49. The facts in such a case must show that the parties treated the employment relation-
ship as terminated from the time of the intentional act. 2A A. LARSON, supra note 5, § 68.11,
at 13-4. Often, however, the partially disabled employee will continue to work for the em-
ployer, creating a fictitious argument. Id.; Note, supra note 2, at 386 n.92.
50. See, e.g., Sontag v. Orbit Valve Co., 283 Ark. 191, -, 672 S.W.2d 50, 51 (1984) (The
Supreme Court of Arkansas stated "[w]henever an employee is injured by the willful and
malicious acts of the employer he may treat the acts of the employer as a breach of the
employer-employee relationship and seek full damages in a common law action."); Boek v.
Wong Hing, 180 Minn. 470, -, 231 N.W. 233, 234 (1930) (The Supreme Court of Minne-
sota stated "[b]y committing a felonious assault upon a servant the master willfully severs
the relation of master and servant. . ."); Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chems., 69
Ohio St. 2d 608, -, 433 N.E.2d 572, 576 n.7, cert denied, 459 U.S. 857 (1982) (superseded
by statute) (The Supreme Court of Ohio recognized that "at some point, the employment
relationship terminates and the intentionally inflicted injury cannot be considered compen-
sable . . .").
51. The category of "nonphysical intentional torts" according to Professor Larson in-
cludes false imprisonment, fraud, deceit, libel, and intentional infliction of emotional dis-
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only applicable to physical violence, such as assault and battery.52
3. The "Arising Out of' Exception
A third theory espoused by courts to recognize an exception to the ex-
clusive remedy provision of workers' compensation laws is that the inten-
tionally tortious act did not "arise out of' the employment.5 3 The ration-
ale underlying this theory appears to be a corollary of the common law
defense of assumption of the risk. The reasoning is that the risk of an
intentional tort is not considered a natural and inherent risk of employ-
ment contemplated by an employee. 54 Accordingly, this exception has
been successfully used in intentional tort claims alleging fraud against
employers. 55 Like the "nonaccident" exception, however, this exception is
tress. See generally 2A A. LARSON, supra note 5, § 68.30, at 13-85; Larson, Nonphysical
Torts and Workmen's Compensation, 12 CAL. W.L. REv. 1 (1975). Professor Larson points
out an additional consideration in nonphysical intentional tort common law suits against the
employer. Based on the premise that workers' compensation is generally limited to physical
injuries, he summarizes his "essence of the tort" test:
If the essence of the tort, in law, is non-physical, and if the injuries are of the usual
non-physical sort, with physical injury being at most added to the list of injuries as a
makeweight, the suit should not be barred. But if the essence of the action is recovery
for physical injury or death, the action should be barred even if it can be cast in the
form of a normally non-physical tort.
2A A. LARSON, supra note 5, § 68.34(a), at 13-117; Larson, supra, at 12-13. Contra Burling-
ton Mills Corp. v. Hagood, 177 Va. 204, 211, 13 S.E.2d 291, 293 (1941) (emotional distress
from fright sustained at work without physical impact was deemed an "accident" and thus a
suit was barred by the act's exclusive remedy).
52. Apparently, Professor Larson bases the legal theories for recognizing an employer in-
tentional tort exception to the exclusive remedy rule on the physical intentional tort of
assault. See 2A A. LARSON, supra note 5, § 68.11, at 13-1. Although these theories are most
compelling in the context of physical intentional injury to the employee, they are not con-
fined to physical intentional torts. Compare Boek, 180 Minn. 470, 231 N.W. 233 (severance
of employment relationship theory applied to allow common law action where employer
physically assaulted employee with a broom handle) with Sontag, 283 Ark. 191, 672 S.W.2d
50 (severance of employment relationship rationale applied to acknowledge common law
right of action where supervisory co-employees' conduct constituted intentional infliction of
emotional distress at the direction of employer; however, recovery denied because of previ-
ous settlement of claim under the act).
53. 2A A. LARSON, supra note 5, § 68.11, at 13-5; see also Comment, supra note 7, at 674;
Note, supra note 2, at 386. Larson considers this to be the most fictitious theory of all "for if
it is a work-connected assault, it is no less so because the assailant happens to be the em-
ployer." 2A A. LARSON, supra note 5, § 68.11, at 13-5.
54. See Blankenship, 69 Ohio St. 2d at -, 433 N.E.2d at 576.
55. E.g., Ramey v. General Petroleum Corp., 173 Cal. App. 2d. 386, 343 P.2d 787 (1959).
In Ramey, the employer made fraudulent representations regarding the employee's right of
action against the employer's partner for a prior injury sustained at work. The fraud caused
the employee to lose his cause of action because the statute of limitations had expired. Us-
ing a dual injury approach (viewing the fraud injury separately from the initial physical
work-related injury), the court allowed a separate right of action for the fraudulent conceal-
ment in addition to the compensation already received under the act. The court stated that
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also somewhat dependent upon particular statutory language.5 6
4. Moral and Public Policy Justifications
In addition to these legal theories, some courts have made moral pro-
nouncements to justify an intentional tort exception to the exclusive rem-
edy statutory rule." The moral reasoning that permits common law suits
is based on the outrage one feels against a person who deliberately injures
another.58 These courts conclude that the resulting immunity of the ex-
clusive remedy provisions operates "a travesty on the use of the English
language." 59
Other policy bases for a judicial exception stem from the recognized
purposes and philosophy underlying the workers' compensation system.
Courts reason that the application of the exclusivity principle perverts
the purposes of their workers' compensation acts." First, many courts
reason that sheltering an employer from liability for his intentional tor-
tious injuries frustrates the humanitarian purpose of the act, which is to
improve the plight of the injured worker."' This sheltering is tantamount
"[i]t is clear that the fraud injury did not occur while the plaintiff was performing service
growing out of or incidental to his employment when he was acting in the course of his
employment." Id. at -, 343 P.2d at 796. Thus, the court concluded, "we do not believe that
an injury caused by the employer's fraud arises out of the employment nor is it proximately
caused by the employment." Id. at -, 343 P.2d at 789.
56. The California statute, for example, has the "arising out of" language, but not the "by
accident" requirement, making this exception more useful. See Magliulo v. Superior Ct., 47
Cal. App. 3d 760, 121 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1975); CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600 (West 1989 & Supp.
1991); Comment, supra note 7, at 674.
57. 2A A. LARSON, supra note 5, § 68.11, at 13-8.
58. Id. at 13-75. Larson believes that this moral reasoning is often misplaced by the
courts in vicarious liability situations. Such reasoning has even been applied to allow a right
of action against the employer where the employee was intentionally injured by a supervi-
sory manager co-employee, rather than the employer himself. Id.; see, e.g., Stewart v. Mc-
Lellan's Stores Co., 194 S.C. 50, 9 S.E.2d 35 (1940), overruled by, Thompson v. J. A. Jones
Constr. Co., 199 S.C. 304, 19 S.E.2d 226 (1942) (common law action for wilful, intentional,
and malicious assault and battery against the employer was permitted in South Carolina
where a female employee was slapped in the face by a store manager).
59. Stewart, 194 S.C. at -, 9 S.E.2d at 37. The Stewart court specifically stated:
To say that an intentional and malicious assault and battery by an employer on an
employee is ... an accident is a travesty on the use of the English language; and the
travesty becomes the more pronounced when it is argued that the employee is re-
stricted for his recovery to the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act....
Id.;, see also Pleasant v. Johnson, 312 N.C. 710, 325 S.E.2d 244, (1985).
60. See Boek v. Wong Hing, 180 Minn. 470, -, 231 N.W. 233, 234 (1930); see also Na-
tional Can Corp. v. Jovanovich, 503 N.E.2d 1224, 1232 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987).
61. Recovery under workers' compensation is limited to only a portion of the actual loss
incurred by an injured worker. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 65.1-55, -56 (Cum. Supp. 1990);
L. PASCAL, supra note 3, §§ 5.6, 5.7 (approximating a two-thirds recovery). The worker
would only recover a fractional amount of his actual loss if the employer's intentional con-
duct is sheltered by the workers' compensation act. The injured employee is further disad-
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to encouraging the employer's tortious conduct.2 Cloaked with the acts'
civil immunity, the employer may cause intentional harm with impu-
nity."3 In effect, sheltering the employer from liability grants the em-
ployer intentional tort liability insurance, which is against public policy.64
Second, many courts reason that the exclusive remedy operates as a
disincentive for employers to improve unsafe working conditions, frus-
trating another purpose of the act.6 5 Finally, courts reason that inten-
tional torts are misplaced in the worker's compensation system because
they are not part of the historical quid pro quo bargain struck between
employers and employees.6 The common law negligence defenses fore-
gone in the original compromise are not applicable to intentional torts.67
Since there is only a benefit to the employer, and not to the employee,
application of the exclusive remedy rule frustrates the philosophy of com-
promise inherent in the act.
B. The "Intentional" Tort Standard Imposed by Other States
Courts recognizing an intentional tort exception have imposed various
standards relating to the employer's state of mind. The requisite intent is
difficult to establish, and the sufficiency of pleadings becomes crucial. In
order to survive a motion to dismiss and escape the statutory scheme, the
complaint must do more than merely allege the employer's intention to
injure. It must allege facts showing the employer's deliberate intent to
cause injury.' As a rule, "the common law liability of the employer can-
not be stretched to include . . . injuries caused by the gross, wanton, wil-
vantaged by the loss of potential damage recovery since exemplary, as well as compensatory,
damages are recoverable at common law for intentional torts. See Note, Right to Sue, supra
note 30, at 282. This disadvantage does not apply to negligence actions, which do not allow
punitive damages.
62. See Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chems. Co., 69 Ohio St. 2d 608, -, 433
N.E.2d 572, 577, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 857 (1982) (superseded by statute); accord Jova-
novich, 503 N.E.2d at 1232.
63. Criminal liability may still exist for actions such as assault and battery, but is beyond
the scope of this Note.
64. See Blankenship, 69 Ohio St. 2d at -, 433 N.E.2d at 577; Beauchamp v. Dow Chem.
Co., 427 Mich. 1, -, 398 N.W.2d 882, 889 (1986) (superseded by statute); Note, Right to
Sue, supra note 30, at 282.
65. Blankenship, 69 Ohio St. 2d at -, 433 N.E.2d at 577. Without the deterrent and
punitive effects of exemplary damages available at common law, there is no inducement for
improving safety conditions. Rather, the most detrimental effect on an employer for not
improving his safety conditions is a slight increase in his worker's compensation insurance
premiums. Id.; accord Note, Right to Sue, supra note 30, at 282-83. Notably, however, Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) regulations provide rules for the promotion of a
safe work environment.
66. See Beauchamp, 427 Mich. at -, 398 N.W.2d at 889; see also supra notes 25-27 and
accompanying text.
67. See Note, Right to Sue, supra note 30, at 283.
68. 2A A. LARSON, supra note 5, § 68.14, at 13-46.
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ful, deliberate, intentional, reckless, culpable or malicious negligence, or
other misconduct of the employer short of genuine intent to cause
injury. 6 9
Most states limit the recovery under the intentional tort exception by
implementing the "true intentional tort" or "actual, specific, and deliber-
ate" intent standard.70 Under this view, the employer must have intended
the specific injury as well as the act. Other states utilize the Restatement
(Second) of Torts definition of "intent."'7 1 Under this definition, the em-
ployer must only have intended the act that caused the injury, with
knowledge that the injury was substantially certain to follow. Thus, the
"substantially certain" standard defines "intentional tort" more broadly
than the "specific intent" standard. Still other states have employed a
lesser "wilful, wanton, and reckless" misconduct standard for the inten-
tional act exception. 72 Under this view, the employer must have only a
subjective realization of the risk of bodily injury created by his activity.73
The more stringent "specific intent" standard, however, has been the
most widely accepted standard. 4
69. Id. § 68.00, at 13-1. However, some states have altered the requisite "intent" for the
intentional tort exception by statute. For a lesser standard of "wilful and unprovoked ag-
gression," see OR. REV. STAT. § 656.018 (1989).
70. For instance, Arkansas, Washington, Indiana, and Oregon courts use this "specific
intent" standard. See Sontag v. Orbit Valve Co., 283 Ark. 191, 672 S.W.2d 50 (1984); Na-
tional Can Corp. v. Jovanovich, 503 N.E.2d 1224 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987); Palmer v. Bi-Mart
Co., 92 Or. App. 470, 758 P.2d 888 (1988); Foster v. Allsop Automatic, Inc., 86 Wash. 2d 579,
547 P.2d 856 (1976).
71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965). "The word 'intent' is used.., to de-
note that the actor desires to cause consequences of his act, or that he believes that the
consequences are substantially certain to result from it." Id.
Michigan and Louisiana have adopted the "substantially certain" standard. See Bazley v.
Tortorich, 397 So. 2d 475 (La. 1981); Beauchamp v. Dow Chem. Co., 427 Mich. 1, 398
N.W.2d 882 (1986).
72. For example, West Virginia and North Carolina have used this lower standard. See
Pleasant v. Johnson, 312 N.C. 710, 325 S.E.2d 244 (1985); Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc.,
161 W. Va. 695, 246 S.E.2d 907 (1978). See generally Special Project, supra note 25; Note,
Willful, Wanton Exception, supra note 30 (discussing this lower standard).
73. This standard is distinguished from any type of negligence standard, because "negli-
gence conveys the idea of inadvertence ... [A]n act into which knowledge of danger and
wilfulness enter is not negligence of any degree, but is wilful misconduct." Mandolidis, 161
W. Va. at -, 246 S.E.2d at 914. This interpretation also comports with RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF TORTS § 500 comment g (1965).
74. "In light of the quid pro quo underlying ... Indiana's Workmen's Compensation Act,
we believe a stringent standard of specific intent is necessary to avoid the workmen's com-
pensation scheme from being 'swallowed up' by a glut of common law suits outside the Act."
Jovanovich, 503 N.E.2d at 1233 n.14. "It seems prudent to hold . . .as the vast majority
have done, .. . that 'intentional injury' means 'intended injury.'" 2A A. LARSON, supra note
5, § 68.15, at 13-68.
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C. Legislative Treatment of the Intentional Tort Exception
Some states solve the employer intentional tort dilemma by statutory
action rather than leaving it to the judiciary. However, these states have
widely varying approaches to the way they structure the statutory inten-
tional tort exception into their workers' compensation schemes. For ex-
ample, the Washington and Oregon acts provide a single exclusionary
sentence for injuries caused by the "deliberate intention" of the em-
ployer.7 5 The Arizona and West Virginia legislatures, on the other hand,
promulgated a detailed and exacting exclusionary section with multi-part
requirements.7 6 The gravity of employer misconduct expressly required in
75. The Oregon statute in its entirety provides:
If injury or death results to a worker from the deliberate intention of the employer of
the worker to produce such injury or death, the worker, the widow, widower, child or
dependent of the worker may take under ORS 656.001 to 656.794, and also have
cause of action against the employer, as if such statutes had not been passed, for
damages over the amount payable under those statutes.
OR. REV. STAT. § 656.156(2) (1989) (emphasis added).
The Washington statute in its entirety provides:
If injury results to a worker from the deliberate intention of his or her employer to
produce such injury, the worker or beneficiary of the worker shall have the privilege
to take under this title and also have cause of action against the employer as if this
title had not been enacted, for any damages in excess of compensation and benefits
paid or payable under this title.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 51.24.020 (1990) (emphasis added).
76. The Arizona statute in part provides:
The right to recover compensation pursuant to this chapter for injuries sustained by
an employee or for the death of an employee is the exclusive remedy against the
employer or any co-employee acting in the scope of his employment ... except that
if the injury is caused by the employer's wilful misconduct,. . . and the act causing
the injury is the personal act of the employer . . . and the act indicates a wilful
disregard of the life, limb or bodily safety of employees, the injured employee may
either claim compensation or maintain an action at law for damages against the
person or entity alleged to have engaged in the wilful misconduct.
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1022(A) (Supp. 1990-91) (emphasis added).
W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2(b) (Repl. Vol. 1985) provides a general exclusion strikingly similar
to that of Washington. See supra note 75. However, section § 23-4-2(c)(2) additionally
provides:
The immunity from suit provided under this section . . . may be lost only if the
employer ... acted with "deliberate intention." This requirement may be satisfied
only if: (i) It is proved that such employer ... acted with a consciously, subjectively
and deliberately formed intention to produce the specific result of injury or death
to an employee. This standard requires a showing of an actual, specific intent and
may not be satisfied by allegation or proof of (A) conduct which produces a result
that was not specifically intended; (B) conduct which constitutes negligence, no
matter how gross or aggravated; or (C) willful, wanton or reckless misconduct.
W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2(c)(2) (Repl. Vol. 1985) (emphasis added). Section 23-4-2(c)(2)(ii)(A-E)
of the West Virginia Code goes on to expressly indicate the required findings of fact for the
act's civil immunity exception in the case of injury resulting from the maintenance of unsafe
working conditions.
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the statutory exceptions, as with the judicial exceptions, also differs."
The standards range from intentional injury to wilful misconduct to gross
negligence.7 8
States which recognize a statutory exception also vary in the recovery
permitted to an injured worker. Many states provide for alternative reme-
dies when an employer's actions satisfy the required standard, and the
employee must "elect" between workers' compensation remedies and a
suit for damages at common law.79 This type of provision has been criti-
cized, however, because often there is no real choice. s0 Other states allow
concurrent or cumulative remedies, whereby an employee may accept
workers' compensation and maintain his right to a common law tort ac-
tion.8 1 The possibility of double recovery is usually foreclosed by an ex-
77. These standards have been imposed and defined expressly within the statutory provi-
sion by some states, and not by others. Compare W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2(c)(2) (defining "de-
liberate intention" under 23-4-2(b)) with WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 51.24.020 ("deliberate
intention" expressed as the requirement for the exception, but undefined). Without a codi-
fied standard, the judiciary is again left to interpret the "intentional" exception as they see
fit, leading to varying and haphazard results.
78. Compare W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2(c)(2) (actual specific intent required by statute com-
porting with the true intentional tort standard) with id. § 23-4-2(c)(2)(ii) (lesser standard
required for unsafe working conditions) and ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23-1022(A) (employer
wilful misconduct required by statute). See generally 2A A. LARSON, supra note 5, § 69.20,
at 13-203 ("The gravity of general employer misconduct ... ranges downward from inten-
tional injury through serious and willful misconduct to gross negligence.")
79. E.g., Aaiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23-1022(A); cf. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-23.1(B) (Cum. Supp.
1990) which provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of this Act, an employee who is sexually assaulted
and can identify the attacker may elect to pursue an action-at-law against the at-
tacker, even if the attacker is the assaulted employee's employer or co-employee, for
full damages resulting from such assault in lieu of pursuing benefits under this Act,
and upon repayment of any benefits received under the Act.
VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-23.1(B) (emphasis added).
80. Forcing an injured employee to choose between these alternative remedies at a time
when he is vulnerable is unfair. If the employee elects to pursue his common law remedy, he
is faced with a difficult burden of proof and the prospect that he will be precluded from
recovery under the statute if he fails. One commentator asked:
Is it necessary that the workman by accepting money from the employer or insurer,
be it under an award or without it, forfeits the right to sue the third party for dam-
ages? He might be in urgent need of money. He might still be suffering from the
accident. The needsof his family, which has been deprived of the breadwinner, might
weigh heavily on his mind. He might be unable to pay for hospital and medical help.
Does he lose his right when he accepts money at a time when he is in no financial
condition to await the results of protracted litigation?
Behrendt, The Rationale of the Election of Remedies Under Workmen's Compensation
Acts, 12 U. CH. L. REV. 231, 256 (1945).
81. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 656.156(2) (1989); WASH. Rv. CODE ANN. § 51.24.020 (1990);
W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2(b) (Repl. Vol. 1985) (providing "the employee shall have the privilege
to take under this chapter, and shall also have cause of action against the employer, as if
this chapter had not been enacted, for any excess of damages over the amount received or
receivable under this chapter").
1991]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
press offsetting provision requiring subtraction of the compensation re-
covery from the ultimate damage recovery in tort."2 Other states utilize a
different approach. In lieu of common law damage recovery, these states
have penalty provisions for intentional employer misconduct which pro-
vide for a percentage increase in compensation benefits under the work-
ers' compensation act.8 3
IV. VIRGINIA'S TREATMENT OF THE EMPLOYER INTENTIONAL TORT
A. An Overview of Virginia Case Law
I
In order to obtain workers' compensation in Virginia, an injury must be
"by accident" and "aris[e] out of and in the course of the employment."""
The Virginia courts consistently utilize these requirements to evade the
issue of deciding whether to adopt an exception to the exclusive remedy
rule in the case of intentional injury by the employer.8 5
Virginia's treatment of the "accident" requirement for workers' com-
pensation coverage has been most determinative in the judiciary's refusal
to recognize such an exception. The Virginia Supreme Court originally
adopted its broad definition of "accident" for workers' compensation cov-
erage in Big Jack Overall Co. v. Bray.8 Virginia courts have construed
the "by accident" requirement to allow coverage for wilful and intentional
assaults by third parties or co-employees, 7 as well as emotional injuries.88
82. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2(b).
83. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 11-9-503 (1987) (25% penalty for violating safety provi-
sions); CAL. LABOR CODE § 4553 (West. 1989) (50% penalty provision); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
342.165 (Repl. Vol. 1983) (15% penalty for injury for intentional violation of safety regula-
tions); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-12 (1985) (10% penalty provision). See generally 2A A. LARSON,
supra note 5, § 69.10, at 13-199 to -203.
84. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-7 (Repl. Vol. 1987).
85. Virginia courts have justified their refusal to implement an employer intentional tort
exception based on the legislature's lack of action on the matter. See HFaigh v. Matsushita
Elec. Corp. of Am., 676 F. Supp. 1332, 1354 (E.D. Va. 1987); cf. Haddon v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 239 Va. 397, 400, 389 S.E.2d 712, 714 (1990) (concluding that the General
Assembly agrees with the courts' rationale that the judiciary should not expand the scope of
the Act when the General Assembly has not acted to do so).
86. 161 Va. 446, 171 S.E. 686 (1933). "Accident" is defined as "an event happening with-
out any human agency, or, if happening through human agency, an event which, under the
circumstances, is unusual and not expected by the person to whom it happens." Id. at 451,
171 S.E.2d at 687 (quoting Vance on Insurance, cited in Newsoms v. Commercial Casualty
Ins. Co., 417 Va. 471, 474, 137 S.E. 456, 457 (1927)).
87. Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Gough, 161 Va. 755, 172 S.E. 264 (1934) ("accident" found
for workers' compensation coverage where insured was intentionally struck with a hatchet
by a client's son); accord Tinsley v. Hercules, Inc., No. 90-00606-R (E.D. Va. Feb. 27, 1991)
(Merhige, J., presiding).
88. See Burlington Mills Corp. v. Hagood, 177 Va. 204, 13 S.E.2d 291 (1941) (sudden
shock or fright received at work by an employee, without physical impact, causing traumatic
neurosis was deemed an "accident" for coverage under the Act).
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Under this liberal interpretation, an event need only be unexpected by
the victim to qualify as an "accident."' 9 Virginia's "accident" definition,
therefore, as contrasted with Professor Larson's view, includes intentional
torts, since the incident is viewed as unexpected from the employee's per-
spective. Accordingly, the definition attributed to "accident" in Virginia
is determinative of the intentional tort exception issue. 0
Federal courts in Virginia have tried to apply the "accident" require-
ment in cases where an intentional tortious injury was alleged against an
employer.91 The decisions in Haigh v. Matsushita Electric Corp. of
America,92 McGreevy v. Racal-Dana Instruments, Inc." and Joyce v.
A.C. and S., Inc.,9" 4 illustrate the frustration and inconsistencies produced
in the courts trying to equitably apply Virginia's compensation
requirements. 5
The Haigh court held that an employee's common law claim against his
former employer for intentional infliction of emotional distress was
barred because the slander and blacklisting at issue was deemed unex-
pected by the employee.98 The court applied the traditional Virginia Big
Jack Overall definition of "accident" for purposes of the Act's exclusive
89. See generally L. PASCAL, supra note 3, § 3.2, at 27-29. The accepted Virginia defini-
tion of "accident" was criticized by Larson for producing unfortunate results. See supra
note 47 and accompanying text.
90. Federal courts in Virginia have achieved varying results in trying to apply Virginia
law and predict what the Supreme Court of Virginia would do. Compare Haigh v. Matsu-
shita Elec. Corp. of Am., 676 F. Supp. 1332 (E.D. Va. 1987) (The employee's common law
claim against his former employer for intentional infliction of emotional distress was held
barred by the Act. The court strictly applied the Big Jack Overall definition of "accident"
to determine that the emotional distress was secondary to slander and that blacklisting was
"not expected" by employee.) with McGreevy v. Racal-Dana Instruments, Inc., 690 F. Supp.
468 (E.D. Va. 1988) (The employee's common law claim against his former employer for
intentional infliction of emotional distress held not barred by the Act. The court utilized
Larson's view of "accident" to determine similar acts were done with intent to injure and
therefore were not accidental from the employer's perspective). See infra notes 91-102 and
accompanying text.
91. See supra note 90 (varying outcomes produced by lower federal courts on this issue);
see also Joyce v. A.C. and S., Inc., 785 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir. 1986). The Joyce court deter-
mined that a claim against an employer for intentional failure to warn or remove asbestos
was barred because it fell under the "'occupational disease" provision of the Act's coverage.
Id. at 1206-07. The court admitted that it had not yet addressed the question and evaded
the issue of recognizing a "nonaccidental" exception where an employer knowingly and
wilfully permitted a hazardous working condition to exist. Id. In dicta, however, the court
speculated that Virginia might recognize a "nonaccidental" exception given Indiana's posi-
tion, but determined that the evidence was insufficient to support a claim for fraudulent
concealment in this case. Id.
92. 676 F. Supp. 1332 (E.D. Va. 1987).
93. 690 F. Supp. 468 (E.D. Va. 1988).
94. 785 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir. 1986).
95. Competing policy justifications have been articulated to support the result either way.
96. Haigh, 676 F. Supp. at 1332.
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remedy coverage.17 While the court acknowledged Indiana's recognition of
an intentional tort exception, it suggested that Virginia would not simi-
larly recognize such an exception." The court based its decision on legis-
lative inaction in Virginia regarding this matter. Since the Virginia Gen-
eral Assembly had not recognized an exception, the Haigh court refused
to take such a "monumental step." 99
On the other hand, the McGreevy court held that an employee's com-
mon law claim against his former employer for intentional infliction of
emotional distress was not barred.100 The McGreevy court applied Profes-
sor Larson's view of "accident," which deemed similar conduct nonacci-
dental, reasoning that, since the Indiana courts adopted his analysis for
recognizing an exception and the Virginia Act is modeled after the Indi-
ana Act, Virginia would follow Indiana's lead.101 Similarly, albeit in dicta,
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit speculated in Joyce that if
Virginia recognized a nonaccidental exception for intentional torts, it
would most likely adopt Indiana's position.0 2 The inconsistent results
emanating from federal courts in Virginia emphasize the need for decisive
state action on this matter.
The Virginia Supreme Court recently confirmed its broad definition of
the "by accident" requirement in the case of Haddon v. Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co.10 3 In Haddon, the employee sought damages from her
employer for intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation
due to harassment and sexual discrimination by a fellow employee.'0 4 The
Haddon court concluded that the claim against the employer was barred
because these injuries were "accidental" under the Act. 05 The court pro-
vided minimal rationale for its conclusion." 6 However, the result is not
surprising since the court had already determined that emotional injuries
come within the purview of the "accident" requirement. 0 7 The Haddon
decision is a logical extension of that interpretation. The recent Haddon
case serves as the decisive law of the judiciary and clearly demonstrates
that Virginia courts are unwilling to accept the "nonaccidental" basis for
a judicial intentional tort exception to the workers' compensation exclu-
97. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
98. Haigh, 676 F. Supp. at 1353-54; accord supra hote 16.
99. Haigh, 676 F. Supp. at 1353-54.
100. McGreevy, 690 F. Supp. at 468.
101. Id. at 470-71.
102. Joyce, 785 F.2d at 1206-07; see also supra note 91.
103. 239 Va. 397, 389 S.E.2d 712 (1990).
104. Id. at 398, 389 S.E.2d at 713.
105. Id. at 400, 389 S.E.2d at 714.
106. The Haddon court simply relied on "long standing" and "substantial Virginia prece-
dent" regarding the definition of "accident" to find exclusive workers' compensation cover-
age and did not address the specific facts of the case. Id. at 399, 389 S.E.2d at 714.
107. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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sive remedy rule.
In contrast with the broadly interpreted "accident" requirement, Vir-
ginia decisions illustrate a conservative interpretation of the "arising out
of" requirement for workers' compensation coverage. 08 Virginia employs
the "actual risk" test to satisfy the causal connection between the em-
ployment and the injury sustained. s09 It requires the employee's injury to
be a natural incident of, or received as a consequence of, his employment,
and not to be of a personal nature. This test has been applied by the
Virginia courts in sexual assault cases, to determine that the Act does not
apply.110
In Reamer v. National Service Industries, Inc.,"' the Supreme Court
of Virginia held that the sexual assault of an employee at work by a third
party was personal in nature, and did not "arise out of' the employment.
Therefore, the Reamer court did not bar the employee's common law neg-
108. See, e.g., Hopson v. Hungerford Coal Co., 187 Va. 299, 46 S.E.2d 392 (1948) (The
injury failed the "arising out of" requirement for workers' compensation coverage where the
employee was shot by an insane third party on a trip related to employment. The shooting
may have been directed against the employee for causes other than his employment.); see
also infra note 110.
109. The test was articulated by the Supreme Court of Virginia:
[A]n injury "arises 'out of' the employment, when there is apparent to the rational
mind upon consideration of all the circumstances, a causal connection between the
conditions under which the work is required to be performed and the resulting injury.
Under this test, if the injury can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of the
work and to have been contemplated by a reasonable person familiar with the whole
situation as a result of the exposure occasioned by the nature of the employment,
then it arises 'out of' the employment. But it excludes an injury which cannot fairly
be traced to the employment as a contributing proximate cause and which comes
from a hazard to which the workmen would have been equally exposed apart from the
employment. The causative danger must be peculiar to the work and not common to
the neighborhood. It must be incidental to the character of the business and not inde-
pendent of the relation of master and servant. It need not have been foreseen or
expected, but after the event it must appear to have had its origin in a risk connected
with the employment, and to have flowed from that source as a rational
consequence."
Bradshaw v. Aronovitch, 170 Va. 329, 335, 196 S.E. 684, 686 (1938) (quoting In re McNicol,
215 Mass. 497, -, 102 N.E. 697, 697 (1913)); see also Hill City Trucking v. Christian, 238
Va. 735, 385 S.E.2d 377 (1989) (Virginia rejected the "positional risk" test in favor of the
"actual risk" test to determine whether the injury "arose out of" the employment).
110. See Reamer v. National Serv. Indus., Inc., 237 Va. 466, 377 S.E.2d 627 (1989) (sexual
assault of employee on work premises by third party failed the "arising out of" requirement
because the attack was deemed personal in nature); City of Richmond v. Braxton, 230 Va.
161, 335 S.E.2d 259 (1985) (sexual assault of employee by supervisor failed "arising out of"
requirement because employment was not traceable as the proximate cause of the assault).
This rationale, however, has only been extended where assaults are sexual in nature. See
supra note 108; see also Hiles v. Richardson, 15 Va. Cir. 422 (County of Chesterfield 1989)
("arising out of" requirement satisfied where supervisor's assault on employee involved
physically removing employee from office and where assault was not sexual in pature).
111. 237 Va. 466, 377 S.E.2d 627 (1989).
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ligence claim against her employer for maintaining an unsafe workplace
and determine that the act was not the employee's exclusive remedy. This
decision is significant for several reasons. First, it confirms a judicial ex-
ception to the exclusive remedy rule in cases of sexual assault.'12 Second,
it permits a negligence claim against the employer.1 1 Third, it implies
that the Virginia judiciary is not averse to applying the "arising out of"
exception,114 used by other states, for intentional injuries if the circum-
stances of the case are sufficiently offensive.
The Reamer and Haddon decisions are reconcilable on the basis of
public policy, with Haddon stating the general rule in Virginia. Sexual
assault rises to a higher level of moral repulsiveness and leniency in these
cases will not be tolerated by the courts or legislature.1 5 Reamer suggests
that the nature of the alleged injuries in an intentional tort claim against
an employer may be a factor in the court's decision to allow a Virginia
exception to the exclusive remedy rule. 1 Based on implied public policy,
112. A judicial exception predated the legislative exception for sexual assault. The judici-
ary implied this exception as early as 1985 in the Braxton case, which is noted with ap-
proval in Reamer, 237 Va. at 471, 377 S.E.2d at 629-30. The Virginia legislature confirmed
this construction in 1988 by enacting VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-23.1(B) (Cum. Supp. 1990). See
infra note 123. This code section affords the employee/victim of a sexual assault by his
employer or by a co-employee a right of action. The Reamer case also has merit beyond its
statutory interpretation. Although decided after § 65.1-23.1(B) was enacted, it recognized a
cause of action against the employer when the attacker is a third party.
113. Conceding that the court did not express its opinion on the merits of the claim, it
seems extreme to permit an exception based only upon a claim of negligence against the
employer, since negligence principles were surrendered as part of the workers' compensation
system compromise. If the court is willing to create an exception when mere negligence is
alleged, should they not also do so when an intentional tort is alleged?
114. Indeed, the Supreme Court of Virginia recently granted an appeal and heard argu-
ments in the case of Kelly v. First Va. Bank-Southwest, No. 90-1144 (Va. Sup. Ct. argued
Mar. 1, 1991), where the employer's demurrer was sustained in the lower court on the basis
of Haddon. In Kelly, the employee alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress based
on claims of sexual harassment and humiliation by her supervisor/employer resulting in
physical damages and, constructive discharge. Brief for Appellant at 4-6. Notably, the crux
of the employee's argument on appeal is that her injuries did not "arise out of" her employ-
ment with the bank. Brief for Appellant at 9-10.
115. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. Braxton, 230 Va. 161, 335 S.E.2d 259 (1985); VA. CODE
ANN. § 65.1-23.1 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
116. Intentional infliction of emotional distress is a nonphysical intentional tort with in-
tangible injuries. Intangible injuries are less egregious from a policy standpoint and there-
fore are more tolerable within the current system of compensation. Interestingly, a great
many of the Virginia cases alleging an intentional tort against an employer involve inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress. See McGreevy v. Racal-Dana Instruments, Inc., 690 F.
Supp. 468 (E.D. Va. 1988); Haigh v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 676 F. Supp. 1332 (E.D.
Va. 1987); see also supra note 90. Hence, the possibility exists that the Supreme Court of
Virginia would not foreclose the idea of a judicial exception for an intentional tort of a more
physical and offensive nature, yet falling short of sexual assault. It is submitted that the
court may have granted the appeal in Kelly in order to address these distinctions. [Editor's
note: The Virginia Supreme Court recently ruled that the Kelly employee's tort claim was
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it may be that a claim for a physical intentional tort has a better chance
to escape the exclusive remedy rule in the Virginia judiciary system."'
In summary, the long line of Virginia cases broadly interpreting the "by
accident" requirement presents the biggest obstacle to creating a judicial
exception to the exclusive remedy rule in the case of employer intentional
torts. The broad interpretation of the "accident" requirement, confirmed
in Haddon, may lead to absurd future results. 1 8 The court in McGreevy
v. Racal-Dana Instruments, Inc.119 pointed out the anomalous results
that may follow:
An employer could be held personally liable in tort for pinching or squeez-
ing, but not for punching an employee in the nose or hitting him on the
head with a two-by-four. Worse yet, failure to adopt an intentional tort ex-
ception would mean that the General Assembly intended that an employee
whose face was disfigured by an employer's intentional tort be deprived of a
remedy, that an employee deliberately assaulted physically by an employer
be limited to workers' compensation, but that an employee pinched or fon-
dled sexually be permitted the full range of tort and compensation remedies
against the employer."
2
0
Although there are signs that the judiciary may recognize an exception
for employer intentional torts in some limited instances,' 2 ' the courts in
Virginia have exhibited their general unwillingness to do so inder the
Act. Virginia courts await legislative action on this matter.
barred by the Act.] See supra note 114. In Kelly the employee alleged physical damages
including severe weight loss, nausea, headaches, sleeplessness and depression which accom-
panied the alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress. Brief for Appellant at 6.
117. This contradicts the results of Professor Larson's "essence of the tort" test. See
supra note 51 and accompanying text. However, Professor Larson's suggested outcome pre-
supposes that nonphysical torts are not covered by the typical workers' compensation stat-
ute, but the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act has been interpreted to include such non-
physical injuries within its "accident" requirement. See supra note 88 and accompanying
text.
118. Admittedly, the holding in Haddon is specifically limited to barring a common law
claim against the employer where the intentional infliction of emotional distress and defa-
mation were committed by co-employees, and imputed to the employer. However, this deci-
sion may serve as precedent for immunizing from civil suit intentional injuries of any kind
and extending the immunity to intentional acts committed by the employer himself.
119. 690 F. Supp. 468 (E.D. Va. 1988).
120. Id. at 473.
121. The Supreme Court of Virginia recently granted appeals and heard arguments in two
circuit court cases dismissed by demurrers on the basis of Haddon's conclusion that the Act
was the exclusive remedy available to the plaintiff employees. See Kelly v. First Va. Bank-
Southwest, No. 90-1144 (Va. Sup. Ct. argued Mar. 1, 1991); Snead v. Harbaugh, No. 90-1119
(Va. Sup. Ct. argued Mar. 1, 1991); see also supra note 114 and accompanying text. Rulings
have not been rendered on these to cases to date. [Editor's note: The Virginia Supreme
Court recently ruled that the Kelly employee's intentional infliction of emotional distress
tort claim was barred by the Act, while the Snead claim of defamation was not barred.]
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B. Evaluation of the Virginia's Workers' Compensation Act
Virginia's Workers' Compensation Act provides the exclusive statutory
remedy for an injured employee against his employer. 122 The Virginia
General Assembly has failed to carve out a legislative exception to this
hard and fast rule for intentional or wilful employer misconduct.12 3 In
1988, the General Assembly enacted section 65.1-23.1(B) which operates
as a narrow exception to the exclusive remedy rule in the case of sexual
assault by an employer. 24 Unfortunately, though, an employee in Virginia
must elect between the alternative remedies of workers' compensation
coverage and an action at law in a case of sexual assault. 2 5 Because the
legislature has not created an exception for lesser types of misconduct,
the judiciary has also refused to recognize an exception, even for inten-
tional injuries. 12
On the other hand, while the legislature has failed to create an em-
ployer intentional torts exception that would benefit employees, the legis-
lature has already carved out an express exception to the Act's coverage
to deny compensation benefits in the case of wilful employee misconduct.
Under section 65.1-38,127 an employee forgoes his statutory right of recov-
122. Virginia's exclusive remedy provision provides:
The rights and remedies herein granted to an employee when he and his employer
have accepted the provisions of this Act respectively to pay and accept compensation
on account of personal injury or death by accident shall exclude all other rights and
remedies of such employee, his personal representative, parents, dependents or next
of kin, at common law or otherwise, on account of such injury, loss of service of
death.
VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-40 (Repl. Vol. 1987) (emphasis added).
123. Several states have explicitly excluded intentional tort actions from the exclusive
remedy provision in their statutory schemes. See, e.g., Aiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1022
(1983); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 656.156 (1989); see also supra notes 75-76.
124. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-23.1(B) (Cum. Supp. 1990) provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of this Act, an employee who is sexually assaulted
and can identify the attacker may elect to pursue an action-at-law against the at-
tacker, even if the attacker is the assaulted employees' employer or co-employee, for
full damages resulting from such assault in lieu of pursuing benefits under this Act,
and upon repayment of any benefits received under the Act.
125. Id. The election requirement contravenes the Act's humanitarian and remedial pur-
poses and disserves the injured employee. The humiliated, vulnerable and injured employee
faces a difficult choice at a time when he or she is probably not emotionally prepared to
handle it. Faced with the prospect of being without a remedy if the action at law fails, the
election provision operates as a disincentive to pursue a civil suit and instead encourages the
employee to opt for the guaranteed statutory recovery. See supra note 80 and accompanying
text. Injuries of this kind were not contemplated by the Act when the original compromise
was made; neither should the recoveries be limited by it.
126. "Until the legislature ... expressly states otherwise, this Court is of the opinion ...
that an employer intentional tort exception is not appropriate." Hiles v. Richardson, 15 Va.
Cir. 422, 426 (County of Chesterfield, 1989).
127. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-38 (Repl. Vol. 1987) provides:
No compensation shall be allowed for an injury or death: (1) Due to the employee's
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ery by intentionally injuring himself or others, and for injury due to in-
toxication, wilful misconduct, wilful failure to use safety equipment, and
breach of duties or rules. The Virginia judiciary has treated this type-of
employee misconduct as an abandonment of the employment relation.
128
The standard used by the courts for "wilful" employee misconduct only
requires the employee to intend the act, and not the injury.1 9
By enacting section 65.1-38 of the Virginia Code, the General Assembly
has already contemplated and injected the concept of "fault" into the
Virginia statutory scheme.130 For instance, specific actions amounting to
intentional misconduct within an employee's control will prevent the
Act's guaranteed recovery. Likewise, where there are intentional actions
amounting to employer misconduct, the employee should not be limited
to exclusive recovery under the Act. It would be consistent to afford equal
treatment in the case of similar employer misconduct.' Since the work-
ers' compensation system was originally based on notions of a quid pro
quo tradeoff between employers and employees, a statutory exception for
injuries caused by intentional employer misconduct would provide bal-
willful misconduct, including intentional self-inflicted injury, (2) Growing out of his
attempt to injure another, (3) Due to intoxication, or (4) Due to willful failure or
refusal to use a safety appliance or perform a duty required by statute or the willful
breach of any rule or regulation adopted by the employer and approved by the Indus-
trial Commission and brought prior to the accident to the knowledge of the employee.
The burden of proof shall be upon him who claims an exemption or forfeiture under
this section.
128. See American Safety Razor Co. v. Hunter, 2 Va. App. 258, 343 S.E.2d 461 (1986) (an
employee may abandon his employment by reaching an advanced state of intoxication).
This view is consistent with the "severed" employment relation exception recognized by
other jurisdictions in the case of intentional injury by the employer. Accordingly, Virginia
courts may be willing to construct a statutory exception based on similar rationale.
129. "Wilful" means with deliberate intent. If the employee intentionally acts, knowing
the act is forbidden, he has "wilfully" failed to obey the rule. See Riverside & Dan River
Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Thaxton, 161 Va. 863, 172 S.E. 261 (1934). This is a lesser standard
than that of "specific" intent, which requires the injury, as well as the act, to be intended.
This lower standard for employee misconduct emphasizes the inherent unfairness in not
holding employers to any standard for their conduct.
130. This section appears to be a codified extension of the common law tort defense of
contributory negligence. However, a higher degree of misconduct is required under this sec-
tion due to the original quid pro quo surrender of common law rights.
131. It is inconsistent to allow the employer to hide behind an exception that the em-
ployee cannot. Other states have applied statutory intentional injury exceptions for employ-
ees and employers equally. See, e.g., OR REv. STAT. § 656.156 (1989). The Oregon statute
provides:
(1) If the injury or death results to a worker from the deliberate intention of the
worker to produce such injury or death, . . . the worker . . . shall [not] receive any
payment whatsoever. . . . (2) If injury or death results to a worker from the deliber-
ate intention of the employer of the worker to produce such injury or death, the
worker . . . may take under [the Act] and also have cause for action against the
employer ....
Id. (emphasis added).
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ance and consistency to the Virginia statutory scheme.
In the event of a work-related injury caused by a third party, Virginia's
Act allows an employee to accept compensation and sue the third party
for common law damages.3 2 Section 65.1-41 provides for assignment and
subrogation rights of an employer against any "other party" where con-
current remedies are obtained.1 3 3 Logic suggests that similar recourse
should be available when the employee is intentionally harmed by the
employer.13  This result could be achieved on the ground that the em-
ployer occupies the position of a third party, using the same abandon-
ment of the employment theory applied to employee misconduct in Vir-
ginia. Therefore, a statutory exception allowing common law remedies for
intentional injury by employers would be consistent with Virginia's cur-
rent-treatment of third party misconduct and the statutory scheme as a
whole.
V. A SUGGESTED LEGISLATIVE APPROACH FOR VIRGINIA
Currently, Virginia's statutory workers' compensation scheme is defi-
cient. An employer enjoys complete civil immunity from his intentional
wrongs under the present system. The Virginia judiciary's failure to cre-
ate a clear exception to the exclusive statutory remedy without legislative
authority deserves the interests of workers in the state and contravenes
the remedial and beneficent purposes of the Act. A legislative approach is
required to afford consistency, fairness, and deterrence of employer mis-
conduct in the Virginia workers' compensation system. It is submitted
that Virginia should enact a legislative provision similar to that of West
Virginia. 3 5
A. Advantages of the West Virginia Approach
West Virginia's statutory exception serves as an excellent model for
Virginia to follow for several reasons. First, it expressly provides equal
treatment of employee and employer misconduct. Section 23-4-2(a) of the
West Virginia Code exempts workers' compensation entitlement in the
132. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-40 (Repl. Vol. 1987), affords the exclusive remedy which ap-
plies only to an employee, his employer, and those considered to be conducting the em-
ployer's business. If the party does not come within the meaning of the Act's exclusivity
provision, the common law right of action is preserved. See Griffith v. Raven Red Ash Coal
Co., 179 Va. 790, 20 S.E.2d 530 (1942).
133. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-41 (Repl. Vol. 1987).
134. Similar to other states' offsetting provisions, the compensation paid under the Act
could be in mitigation of damages of the employer's common law liability. Assuming the
employer is insured, the employer's insurer would also have subrogation rights to the em-
ployee's recovery. See Note, Right to Sue, supra note 30, at 284-85.
135. See W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2 (Repl. Vol. 1985); see also supra note 76 and accompany-
ing text.
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case of certain employee conduct,"3 6 whereas its counterpart, section 23-4-
2(b) of the West Virginia Code, excepts deliberately intended injuries in-
flicted by an employer from the act's exclusive remedy. 137 Similarly, Vir-
ginia could add a counterpart provision to include employer misconduct,
yet maintain the four-category exception for employee misconduct. This
approach would comport with the nature of the quid pro quo basis of the
system more than Virginia's present inconsistent treatment.
Second, the West Virginia approach affords the employee concurrent
and cumulative remedies in th6 case of intentional injuries by an em-
ployer. 3 1 It also prevents a double recovery to the employee by only al-
lowing damages in excess of what is recoverable under the statute."3 9 Per-
mitting an action at law against the employer is an effective deterrent to
all types of intentionally tortious conduct and promotes a safer work en-
vironment, °4 0 thereby serving the purposes of the legislation. This ap-
proach is preferable to the forced election of remedies which often leaves
the employee without remedy,14 ' such as that currently used by Virginia
in the case of sexual assaults. Virginia should similarly incorporate a con-
current remedy provision to insure complete restitution to the employee
who has been intentionally injured and to serve adequately the remedial
purpose of the Virginia's Workers' Compensation Act.
Third, the West Virginia provision statutorily defines the standard for
the intentional tort exception. The West Virginia legislature made clear
what will and will not constitute employer "deliberate intent" in section
23-4-2(c)(2)(i) of the West Virginia Code. 142 It also expressly provides the
136. W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2(a) provides that "no employee or dependent of any employee
shall be entitled to receive any sum from the [worker's] compensation fund ... on account
of any personal injury to or death to any employee caused by a self-inflicted injury or the
intoxication of such employee."
137. Id. § 23-4-2(b) provides that:
If injury or death result to any employee from the deliberate intention of his em-
ployer to produce such injury or death, the employee ... shall have the privilege to
take under this chapter, and shall also have cause of action against the employer, as if
this chapter had not been enacted, for any excess of damages over the amount re-
ceived or receivable under this chapter.
138. Id.
139. Id. This principle is similar to Virginia's treatment of an employee's action at law
against a third party and the employer's assignment rights. See VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-41
(Repl. Vol. 1987).
140. Exemplary as well as compensatory damages are recoverable in intentional tort ac-
tions. Since a cumulative remedy provision allows a civil suit in addition to the workers'
compensation benefits, the possibility of large damage awards constitutes a strong deterrent
for the employer.
141. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text. The deterrent effect of the election of
remedies approach is minimal. The small number of actions that would proceed-and the
smaller number that would end successfully for the employee-would be an insufficient in-
centive for the employer to alter his conduct.
142. W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2(c)(2)(i) (Repl. Vol. 1985). See supra note 76 (precise wording
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legislative intent behind the standard adopted, thus giving the judiciary a
clear and workable standard to apply. 4" This explicit approach should be
used to prevent inconsistency and promote predictability in Virginia case
law. 144
B. The Suggested "Intentional" Standard for Virginia
Using the West Virginia statute as a model, Virginia should also ex-
pressly incorporate the "specific" intent standard into a legislative excep-
tion to the exclusive remedy rule. 45 The standard is more stringent and
has been adopted by the majority of states which recognize an employer
intentional tort exception. 14 This more conservative standard would be
consistent with Virginia's current law and policy. 4" Implementing the
stricter standard would properly distinguish and prevent any frivolous
suits that the new statutory exception may invite.' 4s The "specific" intent
of this section).
143. W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2(c)(1). This section provides in part:
[Tihe legislature intended to create a legislative standard for loss of that immunity of
more narrow application and containing more specific mandatory elements than the
common law tort system concept and standard of willful, wanton and reckless mis-
conduct; and that it was and is the legislative intent to promote prompt judicial reso-
lution of the question of whether a suit prosecuted under the asserted authority of
this section is or is not prohibited by the immunity granted under this chapter.
This provision was inserted in 1983, when the West Virginia legislature statutorily raised its
intentional tort exception standard from one of "willful, wanton and reckless misconduct"
to that of "actual, specific intent." See Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., 161 W. Va. 695,
246 S.E.2d 907 (1978) (superseded by statute) (applying the prior wilful, wanton and reck-
less standard). Obviously, the intent of the West Virginia legislature is not applicable to
Virginia, but the Virginia General Assembly should include a similar statement of its intent
behind the creation of a standard for a Virginia intentional tort exception.
144. See Haddon v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 239 Va. 397, 400, 389 S.E.2d 712, 714
(1990) (where the Supreme Court of Virginia presumed the General Assembly's intent re-
garding the scope of the Act); see also supra notes 90-101 and accompanying text.
'Workers' compensation, once seen as "an identifiable cost of doing business," has been
somewhat undermined by employer intentional tort claims. 2A A. LARSON, supra note 5, §
67.31. However, the economic predictability is maximized in statutory provisions such as
those in West Virginia. The West Virginia legislature's precise and explicit manner of defin-
ing the standard to which the employer is held provides sufficient predictability for guiding
his conduct.
145. See W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2(c)(2)(i) (Repl. Vol. 1985); see also supra note 70 and ac-
companying text.
146. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
147. Virginia is often characterized as a conservative state. This is illustrated by the con-
tinued existence in Virginia of contributory negligence as an absolute defense to a negli-
gence claim. See, e.g., Diaz v. United States, 655 F. Supp. 411, 418 (E.D. Va. 1987); Smith v.
Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 204 Va. 128, 133, 129 S.E.2d 655, 659 (1963).
148. See Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., 161 W. Va. 695, -, 246 S.E.2d 907, 922 (1978)
(Neely, J., dissenting); see also Note, Willful, Wanton Exception, supra note 30, at 909-10.
The "specific intent" standard requires a greater showing by the employee in order for the
alleged claim to withstand a motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment. The Vir-
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standard would afford exceptions to the exclusive remedy in limited cir-
cumstances. Such a result would not stray far from Virginia's present
statutory scheme where the legislature has only recognized an exception
to the exclusive remedy rule under the extreme circumstance of sexual
assault.
Additionally, it is urged that Virginia should codify a provision lower-
ing the standard for an exception to an employer's immunity from suit in
the case of unsafe work practices. Again, West Virginia's provision should
serve as an example." 9 The "willful, wanton and reckless" standard
should be applied to lower the burden of proof required of the employee
where injury results from the employer's knowing refusal to comply with
safety laws which causes an appreciated risk of injury. This lesser stan-
dard comports with the Act's recognized purpose of promoting safety in
the workplace. 150 It does no more than impose the same standard of
safety upon the employer that the employee is already held to under Vir-
ginia's Act. 1 This change would remedy the present disparate treatment
of employee and employer misconduct in the Virginia statutory scheme.
The Virginia judiciary should also find this bifurcated standard consis-
tent with existing precedent. The Virginia Supreme Court confirmed its
requirement of a high standard for intentional injuries to circumvent the
"by accident" requirement in Haddon v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
ginia courts could use this device to prevent nuisance suits and minimize litigation.
149. W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2(c)(2)(ii)(A)-(E) (Repl. Vol. 1985). Although the West Virginia
provision does not specifically refer to a "willful, wanton" standard in subsections (A)
through (E), in the case of an injury caused by unsafe working conditions, the statute uses
synonymous language. The statute provides:
(B) That the employer had a subjective realization and appreciation of the existence
of such specific unsafe working condition and the high degree of risk and the strong
probability of serious injury or death presented by such specific unsafe working con-
dition . . . (C) [it] was a violation of a state or federal safety statute, rule or regula-
tion. . . or well-known safety standard within the, industry.. . (D) [and] such em-
ployer nevertheless thereafter exposed an employee to such specific unsafe working
condition intentionally.
Id. (emphasis added)
150. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. An employer may be guilty of serious and
wilful misconduct, without necessarily having a deliberate intent to injure the employee, by
simply refusing to comply with a statute or rule intended to protect employees. See Winter-
roth v. Meats, Inc., 10 Wash. App. 7, 12, 516 P.2d 522, 525 (1973). Without this lower stan-
dard for the employee, the employer would not be accountable, and there would be no in-
centive, aside from OSHA compliance, to improve safe work conditions, in contravention of
one of the Act's primary purposes.
151. See VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-38(4) (Repl. Vol. 1987), which provides:
No compensation shall be allowed for an injury or death. . . due to willful failure or
refusal to use a safety appliance or perform a duty required by statute or the willful
breach of any rule or regulation adopted by the employer and approved by the Indus-
trial Commission and brought prior to the accident to the knowledge of the employee.
See also Griffey v. Clinchfield Coal Corp., 183 Va. 715, 33 S.E.2d 178 (1945); Riverside &
Dan River Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Thaxton, 161 Va. 863, 172 S.E. 261 (1934).
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Co..152 Yet, the court approved a lesser standard for improperly maintain-
ing a safe work environment in Reamer v. National Service Industries,
Inc.15s The dual standards of "specific" intent for general tortious claims
and "willful and wanton" misconduct for work safety claims compliment
these decisions. Thus, the judiciary may apply the suggested legislative
approach consistently and easily.
C. Predicted Outcome
As a solution to the intentional tort problem, the recommended legisla-
tive approach is an ideal solution for Virginia. Realistically, however, this
approach may not be adopted by the Virginia General Assembly for sev-
eral reasons.
First, a look at the Virginia position on other issues may be relevant to
predicting the outcome of the General Assembly's adoption of a West
Virginia-type approach. For example, Virginia has refused to adopt com-
parative negligence which would balance the negligence of prospective
parties. Virginia instead clings to the antiquated doctrine of contributory
negligence as an absolute bar to recovery in a negligence claim.1 5 ' Like-
wise, Virginia has refused to adopt the theory of strict liability in tort in
products liability actions.1 55 These minority positions suggest a tendency
toward protective treatment of defendants in Virginia. Applying existing
policy to the workers' compensation situation at hand, a predictably simi-
lar protective treatment may be given defendant employers. If so, Vir-
ginia is not likely to enact any proposed statutory amendment to the
workers' compensation act.
Second, the Virginia legislature may be concerned that adoption of this
approach would open the floodgates to litigation. However, adoption of
the "specific" intent standard proposed in the majority of intentional tort
claims would largely combat these concerns. 5"
152. 239 Va. 397, 389 S.E.2d 712 (1990); see supra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
153. 237 Va. 466, 377 S.E.2d 627 (1989); see supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
154. See Diaz v. United States, 655 F. Supp. 411, 418 (1987); Smith v. Virginia Elec. and
Power Co., 204 Va. 128, 129 S.E.2d 655 (1963); see also supra note 147. The unwillingness to
balance the negligence of the respective parties in a negligence claim is likened to the une-
qual treatment afforded employer and employee misconduct in the present workers' com-
pensation scheme. Virginia may be unwilling to adopt a statutory exclusive remedy excep-
tion that treats the parties equally because it would be inconsistent with Virginia's
contributory negligence policy. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
155. See Logan v. Montgomery Ward, 216 Va. 425, 219 S.E.2d 685 (1975). The policy
decision to reject strict liability in tort exhibits a protective treatment of defendant manu-
facturers and industry. This same policy may be used to protect defendant employers and
industry from an intentional tort exception to the workers' compensation exclusive remedy
rule.
156. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
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It is strongly urged that the Virginia legislature enact an approach such
as the proposed statutory amendment to the workers' compensation sys-
tem for the reasons discussed in this Note: fairness, consistency, and de-
terrence of employer misconduct, in light of the purposes of the Workers'
Compensation Act.
VI. CONCLUSION
Most states recognize an exception to the exclusive remedy provided by
the workers' compensation system for employer intentional torts, either
by judicial or express legislative action. There are a number of grounds to
justify different treatment when an employer intentionally injures an em-
ployee. Although the courts show signs of willingness, Virginia has not yet
recognized an exception, largely due to the broad meaning given the "by
accident" requirement for coverage under the Workers' Compensation
Act. Given the Virginia judiciary's hesitancy to recognize a clear judicial
exception for employer intentional torts, the Virginia legislature must
provide the solution to this potentially far-reaching problem. Virginia
should adopt a statutory exception provision similar to that in West Vir-
ginia. This suggested legislative approach clearly defines the dual stan-
dards to be used by the courts in the case of employer intentional torts
and unsafe working conditions. These standards are consistent with ex-
isting Virginia law. The suggested approach also serves the Act's purposes
of providing adequate compensation for injured workers and improved
safety in the workplace, by affording concurrent remedies at common law
and under the Act. Although there is justifiable doubt as to whether the
Virginia legislature will adopt a West Virginia-type approach because of
conflicting policy in other relevant areas, Virginia should seriously con-
sider the statutory approach proposed.
Jodi Parrish Power
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